Replying to LO23850 --
>Nonaka's article clearly demonstrates that he doesn't consider that all
>tacit knowledge can be made explicit. On page 99, he states "To convert
>tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge means finding a way to express the
>inexpressible."
I'm having trouble with the statement above. How does Nonaka's statement
quoted above demonstrate that he doesn't consider that all tacit knowledge
can be made explicit. It seems to me he's saying just the opposite of
what you assert he's saying. Could you say some more about this?
>My research suggests that Polanyi defines tacit knowledge as knowledge
>that a person holds in his/her mind and body. Nonaka quotes Polanyi on
>page 98, "We can know more than we can tell." While much of tacit
>knowledge cannot be articulated, some tacit knowledge CAN be made
>explicit. Therefore it would be incorrect to say that tacit knowledge
>can't be made explicit.
Let's use two common examples of tacit knowledge: recognizing a face and
riding a bicycle. I'll agree that we can articulate or describe certain
features of someone's face and we can describe what it's like to ride a
bicycle. However, that knowledge is typically inadequate in terms of
transferring our capability to someone else. What we've captured in our
descriptions is that which can be articulated. That which can't be
articulated is, by definition, tacit knowledge. So, I don't agree with
you when you say "it would be incorrect to say that tacit knowledge can't
be made explicit." Why? Because of the very statement by Polanyi that
Nonaka quoted.
> >But, let's set aside these definitional issues. Let's assume that
> >Nonaka's use of tacit refers to articulating that which can be
> >articulated. That sounds more like knowledge capture than knowledge
> >creation. One of the examples he uses in that article is the product
> >developer who apprentices herself to a hotel chef renowned for the quality
> >of this bread. Eventually, she learns how to make bread his way and is
> >able to describe how it is done, including a special twisting technique.
> >She acquires what cognitive psychologists call "procedural knowledge" (and
> >doubtless some "declarative knowledge" as well). More important, she
> >devised a set of product specifications for a bread-making machine that
> >also produces high quality bread. For my money, the knowledge creation
> >occurred when she translated what she had learned into a viable set of
> >product specs.
>
>The translation was the insight on what the bread machine needed to do to
>produce good bread. Knowledge capture occurred when she wrote down the
>specs.
>
>[Host's Note: So... do we need another category for knowledge which has
>not yet been articulated, but could be? ..Rick]
There is such a category. It's called "implicit." John Woods, co-editor
of the Butterworth-Heinemann Knowledge Management Yearbook, asked me to
write a paper explicating the distinctions. You can find a draft of it on
my articles web site under the Knowledge Management heading. It's titled
"The Knowledge in Knowledge Management." To get at it, click on the link
in my e-mail signature and, once there, click on the link to the articles
page.
--Fred Nickols The Distance Consulting Company "Assistance at A Distance" http://home.att.net/~nickols/distance.htm nickols@worldnet.att.net (609) 490-0095
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