>Jason Smith wrote:
>Replying to LO18239 --
>
>Ben Compton Writes:
>
>>This raises some very interesting questions. Why is competition "part of
>>human nature"? Is it a survival instinct? Or is it a learned behavior? If
>>the first, then why would our biological make up include an instinct to
>>compete? And if it is the latter, why would we learn to compete so well
>>that it became part of human nature?
>
>To me, the notions of competition and scarcity seem to be related.
>Competition seems to arise when everyone's needs or wants can't be
>satisfied with available resources. I'm not sure that the human nature
>(whatever that is) vs. learned behaviour debate matters that much. The
>truth is, we've been exhibiting competitive behaviours as a species for a
>long time.
>
>>Another set of questions that come to mind are: Why is purusing ones own
>>self-interest at odds with collaboration? I think of it this way: I will
>>cooperate, collaborate, and work with those I can trust. The only way I
>>know who I can and cannot trust is to first compete with them so I can
>>objectively measure their skill, reliability, and performance. I certainly
>>would not want to get into a cooperative arrangement with someone who
>>would slow me down, impair the quality of my work, or consume extra
>>resources because they're not reliable. To that extent I am in favor of
>>pursuing my own self-interest. Besides if I don't persue my own
>>self-interest who will?
>
>Ben, are you saying you would only trust someone with whom you have
>competed? If I wanted to write a paper with you, or serve a common client
>with you, are you saying we'd have to go through some sort of competition
>first? What kind of battle would you suggest?
>
---snip---
This reminds me of a chapter in Douglas Hofstadter's book Metamagical
Themas about the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.
The Prisoner's Dilemma can be reduced to the following 2x2 payoff matrix:
I co-operate I defect
You co-operate 3, 3 5, 0
You defect 0, 5 1, 1
One can reason that if the other is co-operating, a defection will earn a
payoff of value 5, which is better than 3. While if the other is
defecting, then a reciprocal defection will earn a payoff of 1, which is
better than 0. The other party can follow the same logic, so two logical
players will mutually defect, both earning a payoff of 1. But funnily
enough, two illogical co-operators would do three times better.
The paradox cannot be resolved in a one-off encounter. But Hofstadter
describes a fascinating computer simulation where programs repeatedly
transacted with each other.
The most successful program was the simplest. Called Tit-For-Tat, it
followed these two rules:
1. Co-operate in the first encounter with another program.
2. In subsequent encounters with that program, do what it did last time.
Tit-For-Tat's characteristics of being nice, provocable and forgiving are
relevant to the workplace, where there are iterated transactions with
colleagues and customers. A supplier who repeatedly delivers quality
goods on time is rewarded with continued co-operation (perhaps an
exclusive contract). While a law firm which gives poorly researched
faulty advice is not invited next time.
Note that Tit-For-Tat could not "win", in the sense of doing "better" than
its partner. What it did do was to encourage its partner to co-operate,
thus maximising benefits for both sides.
--Richard Hills <staffdev@ozemail.com.au>
Learning-org -- Hosted by Rick Karash <rkarash@karash.com> Public Dialog on Learning Organizations -- <http://www.learning-org.com>